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Abstract 
Corporate governance broadly refers to the mechanisms, relations, and processes by which a 
corporation is controlled and is directed; involves balancing the many interests of a 
corporation’s stakeholders.i  Since the financial crisis of 2008, much of the literature dealing 
with corporate governance has focused on the financial welfare of its stakeholders.  However, 
following 9/11, civil aviation corporations have also had to take account of the physical 
welfare of their stakeholders when assessing the risks of terrorist attacks. After the recent 
attacks at Brussels and Istanbul airports there is little evidence that significant changes have 
occurred to secure safety in the public areas of airports in the UK, known as ‘landside,’ii 
leading to the check in gates.  This raises the question of whether, should the risk of terrorism 
attacks materialise and lead to the death of victims, there can be criminal liability on the part 
of airport operators. 
This paper will consider the possibility of one form of criminal liability, corporate 
manslaughter, for airport operators who operate under a risk assessment model known as 
Security Management Systems (SeMS).  In this paper, the following example will be used to 
highlight that potential possibility.  An airport in the UK which has adopted SeMS but the 
individual senior manager responsible devolves the responsibility of implementation to a 
junior manager who fails to take additional precautions despite recent intelligence reports 
suggest the likely imminence of a Brussels airport style attack in the UK.  The attack is carried 
out by an airport employee, who had not been properly vetted due to staff shortages. In the 
attack seven members of the public are killed and 50 are injured.  The police and owners of 
the airport assumed all employees had been security vetted.  The Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS) considers the liability of the airport operator when it becomes clear the attack could 
have been prevented. 
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Corporate Manslaughter 
Companies have been liable to manslaughter proceedings since 1965. Until then, English law 
abided by the principle laid out by the 18th century Lord Chancellor Edward Thurlow who 
stated "a corporation has no soul to damn, and no body to be kicked."iii Before the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (CMCHA) came into force on 6 April 2008, it 
was possible for a corporate entity or company to be prosecuted for a wide range of criminal 
offences, including the common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter. However, in 
order for the company to be guilty, a senior individual who embodied the company (or had a 
'controlling mind') had to be guilty of the offence. This was known as the identification 
principle.  
The only conviction of a corporation for manslaughter through gross negligence, prior to the 
CMCHA, involved the company OLL Limited (OLLL) which was owned by Peter Kite and 
responsible for a tragic canoeing incident in Lyme Bay in 1993 in which four teenagers died. 
Peter Kite was convicted on the basis that he was directly in charge of the activity centre 
where the children were staying. He was jailed for three years (though the Court of Appeal 
subsequently reduced this to two years), and OLLL was fined £60,000 Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s high profile incidents, such as the Herald of Free Enterprise and Clapham rail 
disaster, have demonstrated the difficulty in prosecuting companies for corporate 
manslaughter because of the lack of an identifiable controlling mind within the companies 
who could be said to be responsible for a death.  Nevertheless, individual employees (and 
organisations) can similarly be charged over the same underlying incidents leading to death 
under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
The CMCHA created a new offence of corporate manslaughter in the UK, though in Scotland 
it is called corporate homicide.  Section 1 of the CMCHA created the offence whereby an 
organisation management is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed 
or organised – 
 causes a person's death; and
 amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the
deceased.
An organisation is guilty of an offence only if the way in which its activities are managed or 
organised by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach and on 
conviction the judge may impose an unlimited fine Sec 1(6) CMCHA. 
The following needs to be proved: 
 the defendant is a qualifying organisation Sec 1 (2) CMCHA;
 the organisation causes a person's death Sec 1 (1) (a) CMCHA;
 there was a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased Sec 1 (1) (b)
CMCHA;
 there was a gross breach of that duty Sec 1 (1) (b) CMCHA;
 a substantial element of that breach was in the way those activities were managed or
organised by senior management Sec 1 (3) CMCHA; and
 the defendant must not fall within one of the exemptions exclusions from a duty of care
from prosecution. Sec 2 (1) (d) AND Sec 3-7 CMCHA.
Airports as qualifying organisations 
Don’t you have to say first that an organisation includes a corporation? Corporations for the 
purpose of Sec 1 (2) CMCHA means a body which is incorporated, usually a company limited 
by shares or guarantee. It usually has a suffix such as private limited company Ltd or a public 
limited company Plciv. It includes other organisations such as local authoritiesv and NHS 
Trustsvi which have been incorporated. Airports are caught by this provision as many airports 
are operated through organisations that have been incorporated as a Plc or Ltd for example, 
BAA Ltd or Gatwick Airport Ltd.  The Manchester Airports Group (M.A.G) is the country’s 
largest UK-owned airport operator.  It is a private company with shareholdings owned by a 
number of public authorities.vii It operates four airports: Stansted, Bournemouth, East 
Midlands and Manchester which in total serve around 42 million passengers every year.viii  
Duty of care 
Section 1 (1) (b) CMCHA; has been developed from the common law principles of duty of care 
and gross breach of that duty, therefore some understanding of those principles are 
necessary. The common law means judge made law or case law often where an area of law 
was absent of a statute like the CMCHA.  Once the statute becomes law, for example the 
CMCHA, the case law decided before the statute will serve to underline the principles of that 
statute, in the case of CMCHA a duty of care and gross breach of that duty.  The cases decided 
after the statute is enacted enables the judiciary to apply the statute in a more purposeful 
way by reviewing any cases that have been decided under the statute essential the cases act 
as precedents or persuasive decisions.ix  It is important to understand that a statute and 
particularly cases decided under the statute such as the CMCHA gives more certainty what 
the law is to claimants and business organisations.  
The “duty of care” is the responsibility one person or business has to be reasonably careful 
(or to use “reasonable care”) when dealing with others who could be anticipated to affected 
by that person/organisation’s dealings. In the law of tort, a person who breaches the duty of 
care by acting negligently or recklessly is liable for any harm another person suffers as a result 
of the first person’s breach of duty. There has been a number of cases to support this 
principle, the most famous case being Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 House of Lords. 
Mrs Donoghue went to a cafe with a friend. The friend bought her a bottle of ginger beer and 
an ice cream. The ginger beer came in an opaque bottle so that the contents could not be 
seen. Mrs Donoghue poured half the contents of the bottle over her ice cream and also drank 
some from the bottle. After eating part of the ice cream, she then poured the remaining 
contents of the bottle over the ice cream and a decomposed snail emerged from the bottle. 
Mrs Donoghue suffered personal injury (from shock) as a result but she was not able to bring 
an action for breach of contract because she was not a party to the contract. That was 
between her friend and the owner of the cafe. Instead Mrs Donoghue brought a successful 
claim against Stevenson, the manufacturer of the ginger beer and this case established the 
modern law of negligence and the neighbour test, which stated: ‘You must take reasonable 
care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure 
your neighbour.’ Airports, by virtue of the Occupiers Liability Act 1984, are already liable to 
provide passengers in airport buildings with a duty of care to protect them from injury on the 
premises by reason of any danger due to the state of the premises or to things done or 
omitted to be done on them.x 
Gross breach of duty of care 
Gross negligence manslaughter is a form of involuntary manslaughter where the defendant is 
ostensibly acting lawfully. Involuntary manslaughter may arise where the defendant has 
caused death but neither intended to cause death nor intended to cause serious bodily harm 
and thus lacks the mens rea (guilty mind) of murder.  In R v Adomako [1994] 3 WLR 288 the 
House of Lords (now the Supreme Court) set out the essential ingredients of involuntary 
manslaughter by breach of duty. The facts of the case were that D, an anaesthetist, failed to 
observe during an eye operation that the tube inserted in V’s mouth had become detached 
from the ventilator, causing V to suffer a cardiac arrest and eventually die. The Court found D 
guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence, which is established where D breached a duty of 
care towards V that caused V’s death and that amounted to gross negligence. 
Lord MacKay LC: 
“ …gross negligence…depends…on the seriousness of the breach of the duty 
committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in which he was placed when it 
occurred and whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the 
defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in the jury’s judgment to 
a criminal act or omission.” 
The essential ingredients of involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty include: 
 proof of the existence of the duty;
 breach of that duty causing death; and
 gross negligence which the jury considered justified a criminal conviction.
The Adomako case is helpful in understanding involuntary manslaughter by gross breach of 
duty of an individual. How? The application of the same facts under Sec 1 (b) CMCHA against 
an organisation may provide a different result because unlike the case law the court would 
be required to review the exceptions in Sec 2 (1) (d) CMCHA and contemplate whether the 
facts were ‘sufficiently’ gross to warrant criminal conviction.xi 
In the facts of our case outlined in the abstract the allegation of negligence is that the airport 
operator failed to exercise reasonable care when it engaged an employee without completing 
background security checks.  The fact that the airport was either understaffed or a junior 
member of staff made the decision is irrelevant. The question of whether these facts would 
amount to gross negligence would require further examination by a jury of what information 
was available to the management about the risk of an impending terrorist attack.  The probity 
of the employee who helped carry out the attack who was not risk assessed according to 
normal security procedure would be relevant and how integral they were to the attack.  The 
question of whether the attack would have gone ahead regardless of background checks and 
the employee being refused employment by the airport would all be factors in deciding 
whether the airport came within Sec 1 (1) of the CMCHA and causation s1(1)(a) the 
organisation causes a person's death. 
Security Management Systems (SeMS) 
Since 9/11 security planning at UK airport has been influenced by a number of reports.  Sir 
John Wheeler in 2002 and Boys Smith in 2006xii resulted in legislative changes to aviation 
security.  The Policing and Crime Act 2009, which highlights the principle of joint 
accountability, endorsed the Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA) and required 
airports to engage with risk assessment of security threats with other stakeholders. 
The SeMS system is not new to aviation security, Indeed its roots can be traced back to general 
administration, industry and the sector following 9/11.xiii The International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) made the implementation of a SeMS a requirement from March 1 2007.xiv 
According to Salterxva number of airlines and national regulatory bodies complied  including 
Air Canada, KLM and Northwest Airlines.  The New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority 
recommendation is the latest Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) strategy to improve the 
management of aviation security.  Its purpose in the UK, according to recent CAA SeMS 
guidance notes, is to help entities meet European internal quality control provisions of articles 
12, 13 and 14 of EC 300/2008.xvi Although SeMS is not yet compulsory in the UK, the aviation 
sector has been encouraged to engage with it so that it will be more transparent that it has 
met its legal obligations.   
The purpose of SeMS is to provide senior personnel at airports with a high level overview of 
security risks by adapting the principles of SeMS and therefore maintain the integrity of 
security. SeMS allows the potential requirement to manage airport security from an 
outcomes-focused, risk-based approach and provides an opportunity for airport operators to 
consolidate similar functions.xvii The CAA has been clear in its advice to airport operators that 
it is not requiring them to input another system of security but merely to adapt their existing 
system to SeMS.  
SeMS and accountable management 
As previously mentioned, in order to secure a conviction of corporate manslaughter under 
Sec 1 (3) of the CMCHA, activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a 
substantial element in the breach referred to in subsection (1).  The case law before the 
CMCHA would refer to ‘a controlling mind or lack of one’ 
 SeMS is very clear about creating accountability with responsibility and for that reason the 
‘buy in’ is that senior management is engaged and responsible for the programme.xviiiThe 
framework for SeMS is clear that the airport entity should appoint an individual who has 
sufficient responsibility, leverage and power to implement decisions.  The framework 
recommends that the Accountable Manager be at the level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
or equivalent within the organisation.xix  It is accepted that the Accountable Manager is likely 
to devolve this responsibility to an experienced security manager, nevertheless for the system 
to retain integrity the Accountable Manger must still have overall responsibility for SeMS. 
It appears that SeMS provides a clear line of responsibility for airport security.  Consequently, 
airport operators who adopt SeMS, but fail to abide by its recommendations, could be found 
to satisfy the remit of Sec 1 (6) of the CMCHA.  This will still require the Accountable Manager 
to have been grossly negligent in applying SeMS or in managing employees to whom they 
have devolved responsibility as in in the example set out in the abstract. 
Prosecutions under the CMCHA 
Since the introduction of the CMCHA there have been a number of prosecutions.  However, 
there is a tendency to prosecute for breaches of health a safety rather than corporate 
manslaughter.  Nevertheless, successful charges have been brought under the CMCHA of 
which the following are examples. 
The CPS in April 2009 authorised its first charge of corporate manslaughter against Cotswold 
Geotechnical Holdings Ltd (CGH) under the CMCHA in relation to the death of Alexander 
Wright on 5 September 2008.xx 
Mr Wright, a junior geologist employed by CGH, was taking soil samples from inside a pit 
which had been excavated during a site survey when the sides of the pit collapsed and crushed 
him to death.xxi 
Peter Eaton, a director of CGH was charged with gross negligence manslaughter as well an 
offence contrary to Section 37, Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.  CGH was also charged 
with failing to discharge a duty contrary to Section 33, Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
In addition, Kate Leonard, reviewing lawyer, Crown CPS Special Crime Division, explained: 
“Under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 an 
organisation is guilty of corporate manslaughter if the way in which its activities are 
managed or organised causes a death and amounts to a gross breach of a duty of care 
to the person who died.  A substantial part of the breach must have been in the way 
activities were organised by senior management. I have concluded that there is 
sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction for this offence.” 
Although Eaton was later found to be unfit to stand trial CGH was convicted in 2011.  Since 
then a number of other prosecutions have been brought.   
Table 1xxii 
Name of 
organisation 
H&S charges 
brought 
against the 
organisation 
(Y/N) 
Charges 
brought 
against 
individuals for 
health and 
safety (H&S) 
or common 
law (gross 
negligence) 
manslaughter  
Outcome of the 
case and year of 
outcome 
Sentence on 
conviction (Fine) 
Cotswold 
Geotechnical 
Holdings Ltd 
Y GNM and H&S Guilty plea 2011  £385,000 
Lion Steel 
Equipment Ltd 
N GNM and H&S Guilty plea 2012 £480,000 
Princes Y H & S Guilty plea  2013  £134,579.79 
Mobile 
Sweepers 
(Reading) Ltd 
Y GNM and H & S Guilty plea- 2014 £183,000 
Sterecycle 
(Rotheram) Ltd 
N GNM Guilty plea -2014 £500,000 
Cavendish 
Masonry Ltd 
Y Guilty plea - 2014 £150,000 
Peter Mawson 
Ltd 
Y GNM and H & S Guilty plea -2015 £220,000 
Pyranha 
Mouldings 
Y H & S Guilty plea -2015 £200,000 
Huntley Mount 
Engineering Ltd 
Y GNM Guilty plea -2015 £150,000 
CAV Aerospace 
Ltd 
Y Guilty plea - 2015 £600,000 
Linley 
Developments 
Ltd 
Y GNM and H & S Guilty plea - 2015 £200,000 
Kings 
Scaffolding Ltd 
N GNM Guilty plea - 2015 £300,000 
Baldwin's Crane 
Hire Ltd 
Y Guilty plea - 2015 £700,000 
Cheshire Gate 
and Automation 
Ltd 
N GNM Guilty plea - 2015 £50,000 
Sherwood Rise Y GNM & H & S Guilty plea - 2015 £300,000 
Most of the cases referred to in Table 1 above are Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from the 
engineering and building sectors.  The size of these companies has played an important factor 
in the CPS being able to bring action against the senior management.  There has been a clear 
causal link between the managements’ decision making and their duties of care.   
Post-Brussels 
Since Brussels, security at airports across Europe has increased. There has been a rise in 
security personnel patrolling landside as opposed to just airport lounges to give passengers 
assurance.  Reassurance policing, according to Innes (2004), has now become a strategy 
adopted by many police forces.  This strategy focuses on police visibility, targeting signal 
disorder or, as Innes terms, ‘signal crimes’.xxiii Whilst Innes’ assertions were founded on 
policing in community neighbourhoods with the support of Neighbourhood Watch Schemes 
and Community Officers, they nevertheless can be applied to UK airports to counter terrorist 
attacks.  The visibility of policing patrolling airports incorporating Innes’ concept of modern 
policing in the community.xxiv  The ‘signal crime’ in this case is terrorism, and passengers are 
not only aware of the security threat but are often willing and supportive to subject 
themselves to more prolonged security checks because the only alternative is not to fly,.  The 
visibility at UK airports of patrolling police with firearms, police vehicles parked off road and 
near roundabouts and police stations located at large airports has served as a reassurance to 
passengers and a deterrent to terrorists but at the same time has provided legitimacy to exert 
greater police powers to the perceived risk.xxv 
The recent landside attacks cast doubt on whether increasing policing presence is enough. 
Should Europe adopt strategies from countries with more aviation terrorism experience e.g. 
Israel’s know-how mined from decades of actual and attempted airport? attacks and a 1972 
terrorist attack that killed 26 people at what is now Ben Gurion International Airport 
outside Tel Aviv has made Israeli aviation security the industry’s gold standard.xxvi 
Israel applies a system called ‘security circles’. This screens passengers from the time they 
arrive at the airport until they board the plane. Passengers are screened at the airport’s 
periphery, their body language observed as they take their suitcases from their cars to the 
trollies, their tickets and passports inspected as soon as they join the check-in line, they are 
stopped a second time to answer a series of questions and only then can they proceed to the 
check-in counter.xxvii  
One might reasonably infer that increasing security processes in line with the terrorist threat 
at airports would be likely to diminish any potential liability for corporate manslaughter under 
Sec 1 (1) of the CMCHA in the event of an attack.  This would be true provided the risks are 
being actively managed with identified security processes and personnel.  In simple terms 
management will know what needs to be done but the question is whether that has been 
carried out properly or negligently/recklessly as in the example given in the abstract.  All 
organisations will at times be under pressure because of employment sickness, high turnover 
or under recruitment of staff, particularly in airports.  SeMS appears a positive step in the 
process of creating clear lines of responsibility for security managers but the question is what 
process exists to ensure managers are carrying out their roles and ensuring resilience is built 
into the security process. 
Conclusion 
The CMCHA will only be properly tested when a large company, with a complex management 
structure, whose directors are distant in the structural hierarchy from the operational 
employees who are responsible for the act that causes the death. Until there is a large 
company involved in a multiple fatality incident, it is unlikely we will see how the CMCHA can 
cope with the type of case it was designed to deal with. The public’s confidence in the ability 
of the system to hold negligent companies to account will likely only return with the 
successful prosecution of a large corporation following a serious incident.xxviii 
SeMS should not be seen as a way of exposing senior management of airports to corporate 
manslaughter charges but rather the opposite, namely to prevent any such exposure.  It is 
very easy to see the emergence of bureaucracies which fail to outline clear lines of 
responsibility only to later be caught out when disasters occur.  The recent Grenfell Tower 
fire in West London exposes that problem and criminal charges including corporate 
manslaughter charges may be brought in time.xxix  Another example is the Hillsborough 
football disaster in 1989 when 96 football fans died.  In June 2017, after a long line of reviews 
and enquires, six people were charged with various offences including manslaughter by gross 
negligence, misconduct in public office and perverting the course of justice for their actions 
during and after the disaster. xxx  
The CAA have so far resisted advising UK airport operators to create a wider security circle 
before check-in.  The rationale appears to be that this strategy would only place the threat 
elsewhere rather than eradicate the threat.  There is also a logistical problem in adopting this 
security process given the significantly higher passenger numbers in the UK than in countries 
such as Israel.   
The duty of care for corporate manslaughter extends to all security measures the Accountable 
Manager is responsible for and which expose the public to danger. The Accountable Manger 
essentially has to carry out two functions. The first is the evidential trail that the Accountable 
Manager would have to show in order to prove he/she had exercised the duty of care.  In this 
instance evidence of regular meetings with all stakeholders, security staff development, risk 
assessment plans, evidence of those plans and security processes had been carried out and 
regularly recorded. Secondly, the Accountable Manager, would only have to prove he/she 
was compliant with the current CAA’ and good practice would show of continual staff 
development of senior management. If such evidence were forthcoming the Accountable 
Manager and the organisation would be absolved from liability under Sec 1 (1) of the CMCHA. 
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